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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There are only two material supported facts set forth by Defendants: (1) Plaintiffs 
lived and worked in Idaho and were discharged in Idaho; and (2) Plaintiffs did not report 
Amalgamated's sales of adulterated sugar to public authorities. 
The rest of the "facts" set forth by Defendant are what it calls "background 
information" which are Defendant's arguments regarding its view of the disputed facts. 
None of the other "facts" form a basis for the arguments Amalgamated made in the trial 
court. All of the district court's rulings (which are what is appealed) were pure 
conclusions of law and/or based upon Defendant's bald assertion of "no evidence" which 
are, thus, conclusions of fact which are not permitted on a motion to dismiss or a motion 
for summary judgment and require reversal. 
A. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
DEFENDANT'S CONFLICTS OF LAW ARGUMENT. 
The only "facts" relied upon by Defendant were the place of residence and the 
place where Plaintiffs were fired — Idaho. Those facts are undisputed. No other "facts" 
were relied upon (i.e., material to) in this section of Defendant's motion. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW WITHOUT 
ALLEGING THE WORD "IDAHO." 
The only "fact" supporting this novel argument was the absence of the word 
"Idaho" in the complaint. That fact was undisputed. Defendant's arguments regarding 
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the effect of such a supposed shortcoming did not rely upon any other "facts." 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT FAILURE TO REPORT TO 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IS FATAL TO A CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. 
The only fact relied upon by Defendant was Plaintiffs' admission that they did not 
report Amalgamated's to a public authority. The arguments made by Defendant did not 
rely upon any other "facts" (i.e., no other "facts" were material to this claim). 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
PREEMPTION. 
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead it only asserted conclusions of law 
regarding its unlikely conclusion that intentional torts are preempted by workers' 
compensation under Idaho law. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF LMRA PREEMPTION. 
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead, this argument related to the 
allegations contained in the complaint as Defendant recast those allegations together with 
Defendant's legal conclusions. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT ALLEGED ABUSE WAS NOT 
"OUTRAGEOUS." 
Defendant did rely on one piece of deposition testimony: Mr. Sparrow's 
explanation that he was "bummed out" and a conclusion that Mr. Waddoups was healthy. 
Defendant concluded that "bummed out" does not satisfy the requirement that conduct be 
"outrageous." 
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DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE 
WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE WAS 
SUPPORTED BY "NO EVIDENCE." 
Defendant did not rely on any "facts" to assert this argument. Instead, Defendant 
asserted that Plaintiffs only alleged that Amalgamated interfered with its own contractual 
relationship with Plaintiffs. If that were Plaintiffs' allegation, indeed, it would only 
support a claim for breach of contract rather than tortious interference. But it wasn't 
Plaintiffs' claim; rather it was Defendant's attempt to recast the allegations to defeat the 
miscast set of allegations. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM REGARDING "CONSPIRACY." 
Defendant did not rely on any "facts" to assert this argument. Instead, Defendant 
asserted the rule that an entity cannot conspire with itself. If Plaintiffs' allegation had 
been that Amalgamated conspired with itself, indeed, a conspiracy claim would not lie. 
But it wasn't Plaintiffs' claim; rather it was Defendant's attempt to recast the allegations 
to defeat the miscast set of allegations. 
B. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT: A motion to dismiss "admits the facts alleged in the 
complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER IDAHO LAW. 
Defendant did not rely on any "facts." Instead it only asserted conclusions of law 
regarding its assertion that the absence of an Idaho case applying its wrongful discharge 
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claim to a situation involving a Collective Bargaining Agreement meant that it was 
"reasonable to conclude" that Idaho would bar Plaintiffs' claims. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING GRIEVANCE 
PROCEDURES UNDER THE CBA 
The only "facts" relied upon by Defendant were the Plaintiffs' failures to exhaust 
their remedies under the CBA. Those facts are undisputed. No other "facts" were relied 
upon (i.e., material to) in this section of Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING 
"WHISTLEBLOWING" AND REPORTING TO A PUBLIC 
AGENCY. 
The only "fact" relied upon by Defendant was the fact that Plaintiffs did not report 
Amalgamated's holding and sale of adulterated food to public authorities. Those facts are 
undisputed. No other "facts" were relied upon (i.e., material to) in this section of 
Defendant's motion. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF LMRA PREEMPTION. 
Defendant does not rely upon any "facts" in support of this argument. 
C. DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE BRIEF. 
DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT ITS MOTIVATION WAS 
DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
In Defendant's appellate brief, the first section is dedicated to supposedly 
"proving" that the Plaintiffs were discharged for "just cause." Appellee's Brief at pp. 
15-18; see also Orders of District Court (R. ). Defendant never filed a motion for 
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summary judgment on this claim and the district court never awarded a judgment on this 
claim. Because the district court never considered this supposed "fact," this Court is 
without jurisdiction to consider it. More importantly, the "fact" is "proved" by reference 
to its own prior assertions that the Plaintiffs were fired for "unexcused absences" and 
Plaintiffs' acknowledgment that that is what they were told. Plaintiffs would refer to this 
as "impermissible bootstrapping." The Utah Court of Appeals used different language: 
"We believe that it is inappropriate for the court to credit the 
defendant's proffered non-discriminatory justification for its decision 
to terminate an employee and use that allegation as a basis to find 
preemption, thereby potentially depriving the plaintiff of any 
remedy." 
[The] argument is founded exclusively on Delta's proffered reason 
for terminating Hobbs.. . . However, Delta's motivation is a highly 
contested fact that is dispositive of the entire claim. 
Hobbs v. Labor Commission, 1999 UT App 308, atffij 14-15, 991 P.2d 590 (quoting 
Parise v. Delta Airlines. Inc.. 141 F.3d 1463 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs were retaliated against and fired due wholly or partly to the actual, 
supposed, or threatened disclosure of the adulteration of Amalgamated's stored sugar (by 
human blood and flesh) together with their clear refusals to participate in Amalgamated's 
wrongful and/or criminal conduct by, among other things, refusing to remain quiet. 
Defendant filed a "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" and, later, a "Motion to 
Dismiss" (which it later claimed was a motion for summary judgment). Both motions 
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were completely unsupported by admissible evidence regarding material facts or 
controlling citations to precedent. In fact, Defendant claimed that the lack of facts and 
the lack of controlling precedent entitled it to the drastic relief it sought. Defendant based 
its Motion for Summary Judgment on a set of what it called in its reply memorandum 
"background information" instead of following the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration which requires a movant to begin its memorandum with 
a set of facts which it argues is material and to which it argues no dispute exists (and to 
which a non-movant must offer rebuttal). Defendant's Reply memo, at p. 3; see also 
Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997) ("The trial court erred in not holding the 
hearing . . . pursuant to Rule 4-501"). And Defendant began its motion to dismiss with 
similar "background facts" none of which were material to its arguments. 
Defendant's main legal arguments from its two dispositive motions were (1) Idaho 
has a greater interest in Plaintiffs' causes of action than Utah; therefore, Idaho law should 
apply; and (2) Idaho has no interest in Plaintiffs' causes of action; therefore their claims 
should be dismissed. Defendant's arguments are internally inconsistent. If Idaho has no 
interest in providing relief to employees who attempt to further its public policy, then 
why should its laws apply to Plaintiffs' claims when it is clear that Utah law would 
provide relief? Defendant cannot have it both ways. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment must be reviewed as follows under 
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Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading . . . 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). Of course, if a motion for summary judgment is 
not supported, a responding party may rely on the pleadings. As a preliminary matter, it 
must be noted that the mere assertion that a material undisputed fact exists without a 
proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to support a 
summary judgment motion. See Leininger v. Stevens Roger Mfg., 432 P.2d 60 (Utah 
1967). In addition, the following is the proper judicial review of any such motion: 
[0]nce the moving party has brought forth evidence either tending to 
prove a lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging the 
existence of one of the elements of the cause of action, the 
nonmoving party then bears the burden of 'providing] some 
evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the essential 
elements of his [or her] claim.' 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997) (quoting Thavne v. Beneficial 
Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994)) (emphasis added). 
However, before determining whether the nonmoving party has met 
its burden, the court hearing the motion for summary judgment must 
be satisfied that the moving party has met its burden of proving that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(e). 
Connor v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 972 P.2d 414 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). The 
Utah Supreme Court has noted (in the context of a summary judgment) that: 
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If the [requirements of the rules] are not fulfilled, both in letter and 
spirit, the summary judgment procedure may become a vehicle of 
injustice rather than a salutary medium of reaching a swift but just 
result on a pure matter of law, as intended by the framers of the 
rules. 
Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) (quoting Cleveland Trust Co. v. 
Foster. 93 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 1957)). 
Plaintiffs are also appealing from Defendant's motion to dismiss. "A motion to 
dismiss is appropriate only where it clearly appears that the Plaintiffs would not be 
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any set of facts they could prove to 
support their claim." Baker v. Angus. 910 P.2d 427 (Utah App. 1996) (citing Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)). The Court will accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts 
in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1059-60 
(Utah 1995) (citing Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991)); see also Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) (holding that the plaintiffs pleadings 
were subject only to the requirement that their adversaries have "'fair notice of the nature 
and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved."'). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also explained repeatedly that "Rule 12(b)(6) 
concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying merits of a particular 
case." Alvarez v. Galetka. 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997) (citing 5A Charles Alan 
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Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 (2d ed. 1990) and 
explaining that the issue in a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim under Rule 
12(b)(6) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "is whether the petitioner has alleged enough in 
the complaint to state a cause of action/' which is a question of law); see also Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991) (stating that when ruling on a 
motion to dismiss, the Court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [their] favor."). 
If the Court determines the merits of the underlying allegations, the Court 
effectively converts the 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment. The Court 
may not unilaterally convert a motion without giving the opposing party a chance to 
respond as set forth in Rule 12(c). See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622 
(Utah 1990). Because Defendant has not borne its burden to prove that it "clearly appears 
the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claims... ," the district 
court's ruling of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be reversed. Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742, 744 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires simply that: 
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief... shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for 
the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 
The pleadings must be sufficient to give "fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim 
asserted and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." Blackham v. 
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Snelgrove. 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955). Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when 
determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint. See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 
86, 91 (Utah 1963) ("What [the parties] are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an 
opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required."). 
In a notice pleading jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) "is to be liberally construed 
when determining the sufficiency of a plaintiffs complaint," Gill v. Timmu 720 P.2d 
1352, 1353 (Utah 1986) and the text of rule 8 itself declares that "all pleadings shall be so 
construed as to do substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). The days of strict adherence 
to draconian formalities at the pleading stage are over, and the district court's approbation 
of this Defendant's use of adhesion contract analysis for "interpreting" Defendant's 
distortion of the complaint's allegations must be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANT'S FIRST APPELLATE ARGUMENT WAS NEVER 
MADE TO THE DISTRICT COURT AND NO ORDER WAS EVER 
ENTERED REGARDING THIS NEW ARGUMENT; THEREFORE, 
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT'S 
NEW ARGUMENT. 
In the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Summary 
Judgment Order"), the District Court did not make the factual determination that 
Defendant's motivation was its strict adherence to its rules regarding "unexcused 
absences." (R. 918-921). In the Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
("Motion to Dismiss Order") the District Court did not make the factual determination 
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that Defendant's motivation was its strict adherence to its rules regarding "unexcused 
absences." (R. 1391-1393). Moreover, motivation is never proper for disposition on 
summary judgment and facts are not determined under Rule 56 or Rule 12. See Sandberg 
v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) (explaining that where the parties were not in 
complete conflict as to certain facts, but the understanding, intention, and 
consequences of those facts were vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper for 
summary judgment and could only be resolved by a trial). 
If an issue was not presented to the district court, this Court does not have 
jurisdiction. One Int'L Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant does make some misleading references to its prior presentation of what were 
"not material facts, but merely background information" (R. 534) that it provided in 
its memoranda. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 15-18. However, it is undisputed that 
Defendant never even attempted to make any argument to support this new conclusory 
assertion and the Court never considered this new assertion, nor did it make a ruling. See 
supra, at pp. 4-5. 
Although Defendant dismissively refers to Plaintiffs' request that this Court 
determine whether Rule 4-501 is binding on courts and litigants as "purely rhetorical" this 
new argument presented by this Defendant is a perfect example of why the appealed of 
this issue is "purely practical." This Defendant does not present "facts" that it claims are 
material to its arguments; rather it presents "background information." If a litigant is 
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going attempt to make a competent motion for summary judgment, it should follow the 
applicable rules so that courts and adversaries can discern which facts are claimed to be 
"undisputed" and "material" instead of permitting a party to later describe its assertions as 
"background information" and still later, on appeal, recast the conclusions as "material" 
to an argument it implies it made but, in fact, had never made before. 
II. UTAH LAW GOVERNS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROVE THE SUBSTANCE OF IDAHO 
LAW. 
A party who wishes to have the Court apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction must 
prove the substance of the foreign jurisdiction's law. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Bunker 699 
P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) ("In the absence of appropriate references to the applicable 
law of a foreign jurisdiction, that law will be presumed to be the same as Utah law") 
(citing Booth v. Crompton. Utah, 583 P.2d 82 (1978); Maple v. Maple. Utah, 566 P.2d 
1229 (1977)). Instead of proving the substance of Idaho law, Defendant cited several 
cases from Idaho with facts that are not identical to the facts of this case. Defendant then 
asserted that "it is reasonable to conclude" that no cause of action exists for a case such as 
the instant one. (R. 1040). 
If the Idaho lottery offers $76 million for guessing the right numbers, "it is 
reasonable to conclude" that the numbers are 5, 14, 21, 33, 41, and Powerball 27. Just 
because "it is reasonable to conclude" that those numbers are the winning numbers, a 
reasonable person would not expect to receive the $76 million. "Reasonable to conclude" 
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is a synonym for "pure and unbridled speculation" and/or "wild and unfounded guess." It 
is hardly proof of the substance of the foreign jurisdiction's law. 
Even if the district court's conflict of laws analysis were correct, because this 
Defendant made no effort to prove the substance of Idaho law, the district court was 
required to apply the law of the forum — Utah law. See, e.g.. 15A C.J.S. Conflict of 
Laws, §3(9) (stating that there is "a presumption that the foreign law is the same as the 
law of the forum."); Restatement of Conflict of Laws §136, comment h ("where either no 
information, or else insufficient information, has been obtained about the foreign law, the 
forum will usually decide the case in accordance with its own local law . . . . ) ; Bartsch v. 
M.G.M.. Inc., 391 F.2d 150 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert, denied 393 U.S. 826 (1968) (applying 
the theory that there can be no other law before the court until a party wishing to rely 
upon foreign law proves its substance). Instead, of acknowledging the lex fori rule, the 
district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint asserting that it had "already decided that" 
and ruling that the complaint "failed to state a claim under Idaho law." 
III. APPLICATION OF UTAH LAW IS PROPER, AND REQUIRES THE 
REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING. 
The Utah Supreme Court considered and rejected this Defendant's conclusory 
assertions relating to wrongful discharge claims where the parties are subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement in no uncertain terms: 
They argue that because the contractual provision protecting an 
employee from all but a just-cause dismissal protects the same 
interests as a tort cause of action for discharge in violation of public 
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policy, no purpose is served by permitting a discharged employee to 
proceed on the tort claim when he or she has a contractual cause of 
action. Defendants contend that the contractual provision adequately 
vindicates the public policy underlying the tort claim. 
We disagree. As adopted in Peterson, the tort of discharge in 
violation of public policy differs in both scope and sanction from 
any contractual provision that might limit an employer's power 
to discharge an employee for other than just cause. See Peterson 
832 P.2d at 1282-83, 1285 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.); id. at 
1285-86 (Howe, A.CJ., concurring). Both respect for precedent and 
sound public policy compel the conclusion that the tort of discharge 
in violation of public policy should be available to all employees, 
regardless of their contractual status. 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications. 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). 
Through its silence, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs have successfully alleged 
pretextual firings in violation of Utah's clear and substantial public policy and that their 
wrongful discharge causes of action are both permitted under Utah law and not preempted 
by the LMRA. Nevertheless, Defendant doggedly insists that Idaho law applies to the 
claims because that was the situs of the firings. Idaho law, it then asserts, destroys 
Plaintiffs' claims because the cause of action sounds in contract. 
Defendant reasons that because the "just cause" requirement arises out of a 
contract (the CBA) and the Idaho wrongful discharge claim sounds in contract, Plaintiffs' 
claims must be preempted. This non-sequitur forms the foundation for Defendant's 
LMRA preemption arguments. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 23-37. 
Utah has held that wrongful discharge sounds in tort and Idaho has held that its 
cause of action sounds in contract. This is a distinction without a difference insofar as 
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preemption is concernced. Normally, there is a distinction, for example, in the types of 
damages available. However, Idaho permits the imposition of punitive damages for bad 
faith despite the fact that it sounds in contract and "it is reasonable to conclude" that 
punitive damages would be available in this case. 
More to the point, the wrongful discharge cause of action has developed because, 
in theory, permitting a cause of action by ex-employees against ex-employers where the 
latter group's actions would have the tendency to harm the public (not where the latter 
group's actions would have a tendency to harm the former group) will prevent violations 
of public policy as effectively as regulating the employers. This de facto regulation is the 
underpinning of the cause of action even though the damages awarded (i.e., the remedy1) 
for the injury to the public are measured by the individual ex-employees' financial losses. 
Both states agree that the elements underlying the wrongful discharge cause of 
action are constructively imposed as a matter of law. See Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation 
Dist.. 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (holding that under Idaho law, public policy is 
implicated by any firing "motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation [because 
such conduct] is not the best interest of the economic system or the public good"). In other 
words, the employer's duties to the public (the breach of which gives rise to the cause of 
1
 Defendant argues that the "injury" under the conflict of laws analysis is "clearly" 
the financial injury to the plaintiffs who lost their jobs. However, the "injury" is the 
damage to public policy or to the public, and the remedy is measured by the financial 
injury to the plaintiffs. This concept is not dissimilar to physical injuries to a person 
which are remedied by providing the victim with money. 
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action) cannot be negotiated or waived by either party to the employment contract 
(regardless of whether the contract between the employee and the employer is express, 
like the CBA, or implied, like employment-at-will). 
A primary distinction between a tort and a contract is, generally, that the 
relationship between parties to a tort is defined by law, and the relationship between the 
parties to a contract is defined by the parties. In this case, that distinction does not apply. 
The relationship which forms the underpinning of the cause of action for wrongful 
discharge is defined by law regardless of whether the cause of action sounds in tort (Utah) 
or contract (Idaho). This is true regardless of whether the contract relating to termination 
of the employment relationship (a firing is an element of the cause of action) provides a 
right of termination for any reason or no reason (employment-at-will) or a "just cause" 
requirement (collective bargaining agreement). 
The key element is the nexus between the firing and public policy. Under Idaho 
law, the concentration is on the "motivation" for the firing. A constructive covenant of 
any employment contract in Idaho is that the true motivation of the firing not be a 
motivation which is proscribed by Idaho law. The violation of this constructive covenant 
gives rise to the wrongful discharge cause of action in Idaho. 
It should go without saying: A cause of action arising out of an employer's breach 
of its obligation which is imposed by law is not preempted by the LMRA because the 
LMRA only preempts causes of action arising out of an employer's breach of its 
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obligation which is imposed by the collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck. 471 U.S. 202,211-13 (1985). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE "MOST 
SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP" TEST WHILE APPLYING LEX 
LOCI DELICTUS IN SUBSTANCE. 
All of Defendant's arguments reflect its "law of the situs" analysis and its 
presentation of conclusions of other courts is without an analysis of the reasoned 
justification for those conclusions. See Appellee's Brief at pp. 18-23. With the aid of the 
foregoing explanation of the importance of the "public policy" aspect of the wrongful 
discharge cause of action, it can more easily be demonstrated that the "most significant 
relationship" test requires the application of Utah law. 
As explained above, the primary purpose of the wrongful discharge cause of action 
is to regulate the conduct of employers. The Amalgamated Sugar Co. is a Utah company 
with its management and corporate headquarters located in Ogden, Utah. 
This is not a case where [Utah] courts are attempting to regulate 
employment activity in other states. Rather, it is a case where the 
plaintiffs] seek[] to invoke [Utah] law to regulate the activity of a 
[Utah] corporation. 
Bumside v. Simpson Paper Co.. 832 P.2d 537, 544 (Wash.App.Div 1 1992). The State of 
Utah has a strong interest in regulating the unlawful actions of its citizens (Defendant), in 
protecting its citizens (Plaintiff Waddoups) from unlawful abuse, and in protecting its 
citizens (the public) from infection and disease caused by Amalgamated's sale of 
adulterated food products. Utah shall not be the Barbary Coast of corporate pirates. 
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Moreover, when Amalgamated, a Utah corporation, sows the stream of interstate 
commerce with food products (which are contaminated by human blood and flesh), the 
State of Utah is likely to reap adulterated food, disease, and possibly death.2 Certainly, 
Utah has a strong interest in applying its laws both to protect and to regulate its citizens.3 
V. DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO 
REPORT ITS MISCONDUCT TO A PUBLIC AGENCY BARS 
THEIR CLAIMS IS FRIVOLOUS. 
In view of the fact that the public goal of food safety can be advanced through 
internal vigilance as well as through governmental oversight, Plaintiffs' claims are not 
barred by their failure to report Amalgamated's malfeasance to a public authority. 
Defendant's firing of Plaintiffs for the purpose of concealing its violation of public policy 
rendered an otherwise private matter repugnant to the public good. 
The employee who chooses to approach his employer should not be 
denied a remedy simply because a direct report to law enforcement 
agencies might effectuate the exposure of crime more quickly. This 
would be a nonsensical distinction. 
Parr v. Triplett Corp., 727 F. Supp 1163, 1166-77 (N.D. 111. 1989). 
2
 "The purpose of [food safety statutes] is clearly the protection of the public 
health and safety. The accomplishment of that purpose is of prime importance and must 
be vigorously championed. The high degree of danger and serious consequences latent in 
the distribution of food to the public require the imposition of the duty amounting to the 
creation of the strictest liability." Niemann v. Grand Central Market, Inc., 337 P.2d 424 
(Utah 1959). 
3
 See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.. 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (holding that the 
United States is not barred by international law from governing the conduct of its citizens 
on the high seas or in foreign countries). 
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The allegations regarding Amalgamated's violation of public policy interests "are 
not dependent on reporting them to an outside agency; they stand on their own." 
Verduzco v. General Dynamics. 742 F. Supp 559, 562 (S.D. Cal. 1990); accord Mover v. 
Allen Freight Lines. Inc.. 885 P.2d 391, 395 (Kan. App. 1994) ("[A]n employee may 
report a serious infraction of a rule, regulation, or law to either company management or 
law enforcement officials."). 
Defendant Amalgamated argues that the recent Utah case of Fox v. MCI supports 
its conclusion. Defendant Amalgamated misrepresents the holding in Fox. 
Fox did not overrule previous Utah law sub silentio. See Carrier v. Pro-Tech 
Restoration. 909 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah App. 1995) (expressing unwillingness to read case 
to overrule another sub silentio because "the two situations are so different"). The Utah 
Supreme Court specifically stated in Heslop: 
We do not agree that plaintiff cannot meet a public policy 
requirement simply because he did not report the violation to the 
Attorney General or to the Commissioner. Plaintiff pursued all 
internal methods for resolving the problem; he need not have gone 
outside the Bank to try to correct the policy violation. 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838 (Utah 1992) (noting that the act considered 
served a substantial public policy because it protects the public as well as regulating 
financial institutions themselves). The analysis in Fox only addresses the public policy of 
criminal law enforcement — not the policy achieved by the law. By their nature, criminal 
laws cannot be enforced unless reported. On the other hand, food can be kept clean and 
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the public can be kept healthy without reports to public authorities. In this situation: 
[A] fundamental public interest is implicated whether or not the 
plaintiff reports any alleged wrongdoing to an outside agency, and 
whether or not a statute has been violated. 
Verduzco, 742 F. Supp at 561: accord Moskal v. Fist Tennessee Bank, 815 S.W.2d 509 
(Tenn. App. 1991) (acknowledging cause of action asserted by employee who refused to 
participate, continue to participate, or remain silent about illegal activities); See also 
Bovle v. Vista Eyewear. Inc.. 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. App. 1985) (holding that allegation 
of employer's violation of FDA standards was basis of public policy exception where 
fired employee warned and threatened employer, continued to attempt to comply with 
FDA regulations and eventually reported her employer to the FDA. "[A]ny one of those 
allegations would state a cause of action." Id. at 877); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 
Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (holding that employee had a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where he urged his employer to comply 
with state FDCA); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores. Inc.. 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that an employee who was discharged where complaints concerned his 
employer's sale and delivery of adulterated milk stated a claim under California law). 
In addition, Mr. Sparrow was harassed for cooperating with and supporting Mr. 
Waddoups and was fired only days after Mr. Waddoups's suspension. See, e^g., Reich v. 
Cambridgeport Air Systems. Inc., 26 F.3d 1187 (1st Cir. 1994) (addressing questions of 
fact raised by joint actors in employee-housecleaning meant "to impress on employees 
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not to be palsy with bad actors."). 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE 
FACTUAL QUESTIONS FOR THE JURY. 
The Defendant did not satisfy its burden to demonstrate the non-existence of a 
dispute as to the material facts underlying Plaintiffs' claims. Instead, this Defendant 
simply glommed on to a single proletarian phrase uttered by one of the Plaintiffs: 
"bummed out" (R. 339) and mixed it with its own favorite crass phrase "no evidence." 
Defendant insists that its denigration of Mr. Sparrow's lexicon and attribution of that 
lingo Mr. Waddoups entitles it to a summary judgment because Mr. Sparrow's phrase 
"hardly shows a 'disabling' condition" while it presents its own hackneyed phrase which 
"hardly shows an entitlement to summary judgment." See Appellee's Brief at n. 11. 
While Defendant is correct that "bummed out," standing alone, does not "show" 
disablement by a preponderance of the evidence, it does create an issue of material 
disputed fact. Its phrase of "no evidence" does nothing except demonstrate its own 
failure to properly support its motion as provided for in Rule 56. 
Defendant also insists that its conduct toward Plaintiffs prior to their discharges 
was not "outrageous." Amalgamated's manager4 grabbed Mr. Waddoups and forcibly 
4
 Defendant makes the wild assumption that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the 
perpetrator was a manager. First, its source of this "clarification" is a self-serving 
assertion rather than any testimony or Plaintiffs' actual allegations. Second, even if the 
perpetrator were a non-manager, it would be Amalgamated's agent at company-mandated 
calisthenics. These facts would still give rise to a finding of Amalgamated's culpability 
by a factual finding of approbation or subsequent failure to disavow the actions. 
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simulated a homosexual sex act (portraying Plaintiff as the scapegoat for the death of the 
homosexual and concomitant contamination as well as graphically illustrating 
management's view that in this particular male-on-male relationship it would be the 
dominant "butch" partner in response to Plaintiffs' outspoken complaints). 
Amalgamated's manager slapped Mr. Sparrow in the head with a notebook and taunted 
him about his firing (foreshadowing the then-future event). While it appears that such 
conduct is deemed acceptable and commonplace in the experience of Amalgamated's 
management, this Court may state as a matter of law that such conduct would be deemed 
outrageous by normal citizens. 
Moreover, outrageousness in this case will be proved by the totality of the 
evidence, not by taking a single inapt phrase out of context and by itself. Plaintiff 
Waddoups could not sleep for a significant period of time and Plaintiff Sparrow could not 
get out of bed to provide a living for himself. 
Disability will be shown not just by the Plaintiffs' visits to psychiatrists. People 
who have no money because their employer has wrongfully discharged them don't 
respond to disabling emotional distress by visiting a psychiatrist. They drink. Heavily. 
This Defendant's condescending assertion that it is entitled to a summary 
judgment because it repeats "no evidence" over and over and because the Plaintiffs have 
not provided it with proof of a doctor's diagnosis (because this Defendant never requested 
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such information5) is frivolous. It must ask the proper questions, apply the proper 
standards and, usually, wait for the presentation of all of the evidence to a jury. This 
Defendant has simply implied that the Plaintiffs must have been motionless and helpless 
for the past six years or else they were not disabled by its outrageous misconduct and are 
entitled to no remedy. Such an interpretation of "disabled" is frivolous. 
The above facts, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs as required on a 
motion for summary judgment, would at least suffice to create an issue of material fact. 
See Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp.. 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) ("As the moving 
party, [Defendant] had the affirmative burden of establishing [by doing more than 
saying "no evidence] that there were no material issues of fact as to its liability."). 
Lastly, Defendant argues workers' compensation exclusivity. "Intentional" torts 
are not "accidents" under Idaho's workers' compensation scheme. Therefore, 
Defendant's argument is without merit. 
VII. DEFENDANT INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED WITH 
PLAINTIFFS' PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE. 
5
 Rule 56 cannot be converted into a de facto discovery technique by permitting 
defendants to file dispositive motions alleging "no evidence." A party who is faced with 
one of these frivolous "no evidence" motions should not face dismissal of their claims if 
they do not prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence in response to the 
motion. A responding party is not required to respond with any additional information 
beyond their pleadings unless the moving party in a "no evidence" motion presents proof 
that the moving party has properly inquired into all material facts underlying the elements 
of the cause of action. Nothing in Rule 56 or this Court's caselaw provides for this 
Defendant's absurd abuse of the judicial system by simply asserting "no evidence." 
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Defendant fired Plaintiffs for unlawful reasons, misrepresented their true 
motivation to the unemployment compensation board, and placed a permanent black mark 
on Plaintiffs' work history. Despite the "no evidence" assertions made by this Defendant, 
this Court has already ruled that "discharge of an employee because of his failure to 
violate a clear and substantial public policy is an 'improper purpose'" under this cause of 
action. Peterson v. Browning. 832 P.2d at 1284 (Utah 1994). Therefore, this Court 
should find that there are questions of fact and reverse the Summary Judgment Order and 
Order of Dismissal. 
VIII. DEFENDANT MISREPRESENTED FACTS. 
This Defendant claims that it did not misrepresent facts, instead it "merely quoted 
from [Plaintiff Waddoups's] deposition testimony." This assertion is false. This 
Defendant never acknowledged its misrepresentation or withdrew it. Instead it 
compounds the original failure of honesty toward the tribunal. To be perfectly clear, 
Defendant stated as follows: "Waddoups in his deposition testified that he 'never' said 
to the Company that he was thinking of going public with any concern about 
contaminated sugar." (R. 1187). This statement has repeatedly been shown to be 
abjectly false. If this misstatement had been inadvertent, it would have been withdrawn 
and clarified years ago.6 It has not been corrected, and the district court probably relied 
6
 Note: Plaintiffs have declined to appeal the district court's denials of their Rule 
11 motions and present this argument for the purpose of clarifying the failure of this 
Defendant to provide proper support for its dispositive motions and also to counteract this 
Defendant's attacks on Plaintiffs' counsel which are set forth in its brief. 
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upon this statement which is, at best, misleading. See Boice v. Marble. 1999 UT 71, at n. 
5, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Courts have repeatedly decried misleading statements by 
counsel because they do not promote justice, tend to provoke and enrage opposing 
counsel, and tend to interfere with smooth operation of the courts and their truth-finding 
mission. 
In this case, Findlay has quoted the statute to read as he would like it 
to read. When one inserts the language that he omitted from his 
quote, it is obvious that the statute does not stand for the proposition 
that he claims it supports. On the basis of the facts presented, it is 
clear that the quote was meant to mislead the court. This behavior 
will not be tolerated. 
Cascade Energy v. Banks. 87 F.3d 1146 (D. Utah 1996) (citation omitted). The trial court 
both tolerated and rewarded this Defendant's misleading statement of fact which formed a 
basis for its argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse all the District 
Court's rulings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ d a y of April, 2001. 
CARR& WXDBOXJPS 
JTRENT J. WADDO^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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